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Abstract
We develop an agent-based model in which heterogeneous firms and households interact
in labor and good markets according to centralized or decentralized search and matching
protocols. As the model has a deterministic backbone and a full-employment equilibrium,
it can be directly compared to Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models.
We study the effects of negative productivity shocks by way of impulse-response func-
tions (IRF). Simulation results show that when search and matching are centralized, the
economy is always able to return to the full employment equilibrium and IRFs are similar
to those generated by DSGE models. However, when search and matching are local, co-
ordination failures emerge and the economy persistently deviates from full employment.
Moreover, agents display persistent heterogeneity. Our results suggest that macroeco-
nomic models should explicitly account for agents’ heterogeneity and direct interactions.
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1 Introduction
In this work, we develop an agent-based model to study the macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. full
employment, coordination failures, involuntary unemployment) emerging out of the interactions
occurring between heterogeneous firms and households in good and labor markets.
Since the “New Classical” revolution, most macroeconomists have been developing micro-
founded macroeconomic model where a fully rational, representative household or firm maxi-
mizes an intertemporal utility or profit function under some constraints. Such a methodological
commitment has allowed the profession to circumvent the problems of existence and stability
of the general equilibrium (Kirman, 1989). Nevertheless, the price paid for such a shortcut has
not been cheap: agents’ heterogeneity and local interactions have been disregarded (see Kir-
man, 1992, for a sharp critique of the representative agent assumption). The nemesis has come
under the semblance of the Great Recession. Indeed, standard macroeconomics incarnated in
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE, Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2011) mod-
els has had serious difficulty in explaining the emergence of such a deep downturn (Krugman,
2011) because it was unequipped to account for the agents’ heterogeneities and interactions
that were at the core of key drivers of the crisis such as inequality, systemic risks and banking
crises (Stiglitz, 2015; Stiglitz, 2011).
At the same time, since the seminal contribution of Leijonhufvud (1970), a research venture
has been studying how coordination mechanisms in decentralized markets can possibly lead to
full employment equilibrium or to persistent disequilibria (see e.g. Clower and Leijonhufvud,
1975; Solow and Stiglitz, 1968). In the latter case, mismatches between demand and supply of
goods and labor are the norm, coordination failures (Cooper and John, 1988) can emerge, and
one can explain the emergence of involuntary unemployment without assuming a plethora of
imperfections and frictions.
The natural outcome of such a program is to consider the economy as a complex evolving
system, i.e. as an ecology populated by heterogeneous agents whose far-from-equilibrium in-
teractions continuously change the structure of the system (Battiston et al., 2016; Dosi, 2012;
Farmer and Foley, 2009; Kirman, 2010, 2016; Rosser, 2011). This is the methodological core
2
of agent-based computational economics (ACE, LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008; Tesfatsion and
Judd, 2006). Agent-based models (ABM) have “behavioral” microfoundations (Akerlof, 2002):
in line with the micro-empirical evidence, agents (e.g. firms, workers, households) behave adap-
tively and employ heuristics in their decision and forecasting processes (see e.g. Camerer et al.,
2011; Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011; Hommes, 2014; Tversky
and Kahneman, 1986).
An increasing number of agent-based models has studied decentralized interactions of het-
erogeneous agents in goods and/or labor markets.1 In this work, however, we take a different
path. Our aim is to develop a parsimonious model which bridges the agent-based framework
with the DSGE one (see Fagiolo and Roventini, 2012, 2016, for a comparison of the DSGE and
ACE paradigms) in order to study the role of coordination mechanisms in decentralized market
economies. Indeed, our ABM is characterized by the presence of a full employment symmetric
equilibrium, which can be considered as the reference point for the dynamics of the economic
system. Moreover, as in the DSGE framework, the model sports a deterministic skeleton that
can be hit by exogenous stochastic shocks. Such a structure allows one to directly compare
the impulse-response functions (IRF) produced by both models and to assess the conditions (if
any) under which the economy goes back to the full employment equilibrium after a shock.
The model considers an economy where heterogeneous firms and households trade in the
goods and labor markets. Market interactions occur according to two different protocols. Sim-
ilarly to DSGE models, in the centralized matching scenario, a fictitious auctioneer solves any
possible coordination problem among the agents. On the contrary, in the decentralized match-
ing scenario, agents locally interact in the markets. In such a regime, matching frictions and
agents’ heterogeneity may lead to imperfect allocations of goods and labor.
In both scenarios, we study the response of the economy to negative productivity shocks.
Simulation results show that in the fully centralized scenario, the economy always come back to
1The number of macroeconomic agent-based model is increasing fast and an exhaustive list is beyond the
scope of this work. For germane macro ABMs, see Ashraf et al. (2011), Assenza et al. (2015), Dawid et al.
(2014), Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Dosi et al. (2013, 2015, 2010, 2016), Lamperti et al. (2016), Popoyan et al.
(2015), Riccetti et al. (2015), Russo et al. (2007), and Seppecher and Salle (2015). See also Fagiolo and Roventini
(2016) for a survey of macro agent-based models.
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the full employment equilibrium, thus exhibiting a dynamics consistent with standard DSGE
models. The presence of a “benevolent social planner” that organizes information efficiently
works as a deus ex machina, thus solving any possible coordination issue among agents. On
the contrary in the fully decentralized regime, where information is dispersed and interactions
are local, the economy fluctuates around an underemployment equilibrium characterized by
persistent heterogeneity in firm and household populations. In addition, in this scenario the
emerging coordination failures prevent real wage movements from driving the economy back to
the full employment equilibrium. The latter results depends on the interplay between demand
feedbacks and matching frictions in a population of heterogeneous agents. This suggests that
macroeconomic models should seriously take into account agents’ heterogeneity and decentral-
ized market interactions.
The rest of the work is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is introduced. Simu-
lation results are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a closed economy populated by F firms and H households. Firms produce a
consumption good by using a linear technology that employs only labor. Households supply
labor inelastically and consume the final good using the wage received by firms and their stock
of liquid wealth. In the good and labor markets, firms and households are matched according
to different protocols.
2.1 Timeline of events
In any given time period (t), the following microeconomic decisions take place in sequential
order:
1. Financial state variables are updated. Firms update their net-worth and households
update their wealth.
2. Firms set their offered wage, the selling price and determine their expected demand.
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3. Households compute their desired consumption levels.
4. The labour market opens. Employers and employees are matched using different protocols
(see Section 2.3.1 below). Production takes place. Households receive their wages.
5. The goods market opens. Firms and consumers are matched using different protocols (see
Section 2.3.2 below). Firms compute their profits and distribute dividends to households.
6. Households calculate their consumption expenditure and their savings.
7. Bankrupted firms exit from the economy and are replaced by new ones on a one-to-one
basis. Also the wealth of defaulted households is reset to a constant value.
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP, investment, employment) are
computed summing over the corresponding microeconomic variables.
2.2 Consumption, production, prices and wages
Firms fix production as well as the price and the wage they offer to the workers. At the same
time, households set their desired consumption.
In line with the spirit of agent-based models and with microeconomic evidence, agents
have adaptive behaviours and employ heuristics (see e.g. Camerer et al., 2011; Gigerenzer and
Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011; Hommes, 2014; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986),
which usually boil down to linear decision rules. This also allows to keep the dimensionality of
the parameter space as low as possible. Each decision rule is a linear combination of two effects:
(i) a within’ effect reflecting decisions based on the past levels of agent’s state variables; (ii)
a network effect accounting for the position of each agent with respect of its own peers. The
latter effect allows to study how social interactions with neighbours (see Brock and Durlauf,
2001; Durlauf, 2004) influence the decisions of each agent.
The wage of a typical firm f is set as:
Wf,t = Wf,t−1 + γ∆Pf,t−1 + αzlabf,t−1 + β(W¯f,t−1 −Wf,t−1), γ > 0, α > 0, β > 0 (1)
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where ∆Pf,t−1 = Pf,t−1−Pf,t−2 relates price growth to wage dynamics (as in Solow and Stiglitz,
1968). The term zlabf,t−1 = ndf,t−1−nsf,t−1 represents the firm excess demand for labour and implies
that a gap between open and filled vacancies will lead to an increase in the wage offered by
the firm, thus reflecting the attempts of the latter to become more competitive in attracting
workers (see e.g. Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). The third term captures
social interaction effects, measuring the deviations of firm wage with respect to the average
wage set by the Nf neighbors of the firm in the previous period, i.e. W¯f,t−1 =
∑Nf
j=1 ωf,jWj,t−1.
We assume that the network is complete so that Nf = N − 1 for any firm f and that, in the
computation of the average wage, each firm f randomly assigns heterogeneous weights ωf,j to
its neighbors.2
In a similar way, firms fix price in an imperfect competition framework according to the
linear rule:
Pf,t = Pf,t−1 + γ∆Wf,t−1 + αzgoodf,t−1 + β(P¯f,t−1 − Pf,t−1), . γ > 0, α > 0, β > 0 (2)
The first term indexes price to wage growth. Notice that in the model, wage and price setting
rules are linked one with the other, reflecting dynamic wage-indexation to prices and mark-up
pricing in the spirit of Solow and Stiglitz (1968). Moreover, in line with “customer market”
models (Diamond, 1971; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 2003; Phelps and Winter, 1970), firms increase
their price in presence of positive excess demand zgoodf,t−1 = qdf,t−1−qsf,t−1 to exploit market power.
Finally, the latter term in Eq. (2) captures the distance between the firm’s price and the average
one of its neighbors in the previous period (P¯f,t−1 =
∑Nf
j=1 ωf,jPj,t−1). Again, we assume that
the firms network is complete, i.e. Nf = N − 1, ∀f .
The production of the consumption good takes place by means of a linear production process
employing only labor (nf,t):
qsf,t = af,tnf,t, (3)
2In order to generate the random graph we have adopted the Matlab functions built by Bounova and Weck
(2012) and available online at http://strategic.mit.edu/downloads.php?page=matlab_networks.
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where af,t is the firm-specific labour productivity. Firms set desired production (qˆf,t) using a
rule accounting for both within and network effects:
qˆf,t = q˜f + αzgoodf,t−1 + β(q¯f,t−1 − qf,t−1). α > 0, β > 0 (4)
The term q˜f captures reference production level, in line with the insights from behavioral
economics about reference-dependence and the role of status quo biases in decision-making (see
e.g. Kahneman et al., 1991; Koszegi and Rabin, 2009). The above rule implies that deviations
from the reference level of production are due to past excess demand zgoodf,t−1 and to the relative
position of the firm vis-á-vis its neighbors qf,t−1 − q¯f,t−1, with q¯f,t−1 = ∑Nfj=1 ωf,jqj,t−1 being the
average production level set by firm f ’s neighbors in the previous period. .
Similarly to firms, households have a reference level for consumption, c˜h. In addition, con-
sumption is determined by the real value of wealth growth (∆Ah,t/Pt−1) to keep into account
the empirically relevant effect that wealth variation has on consumption (see Jawadi and Sousa,
2014; Sousa, 2009). Moreover, household consumption is affected by social interaction effects,
captured by the average level of past consumption across neighbors, c¯h,t−1 =
∑Nh
j=1 ωh,jcj,t−1.
Such a social interaction effect allows one to account for external habits (see Abel, 1990; Due-
senberry, 1949). To sum up, desired consumption is fixed according to:
cˆh,t = c˜h + α
∆Ah,t
Pt−1
+ β(c¯h,t−1 − ch,t−1), α > 0, β > 0 (5)
2.3 Search and matching
In both goods and labor markets, there are two alternative matching scenarios. In the cen-
tralized matching scenarios, the presence of a fictitious auctioneer allows to avoid possible
coordination issues among agents in the market. On the contrary, in the decentralized matching
scenario, firms and workers interact locally in both the goods and labor market (in line with
an increasing literature in agent-based models, see e.g. Ashraf et al., 2011; Assenza et al., 2015;
Dosi et al., 2016; Popoyan et al., 2015; Riccetti et al., 2015; Seppecher and Salle, 2015). Such
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a scenario allows us to study the relevance of heterogeneity and interactions and the possible
emergence of coordination failures in a fully decentralized economy subject to shocks (more in
Section 3 below).
2.3.1 The labour market
Firms demand labor to fulfill their production plans. Workers supply labour inelastically and
have a zero reservation wage. Labour is measured in working hours terms.
Centralized matching regime. An “auctioneer” collects vacancies posted by firms and allocate
workers to firms in proportion to their relative wage offers. Given the total number of households
(H) and firms (F ), the amount of labour supply allocated to each firm f is:
nsf,t =
H
F
(
Wf,t
W¯t
)
. (6)
where Wf,t is the firm wage and W¯t is market average wage. From (3) and (4) it follows that
the labour demand of each firm is
ndf,t =
qˆf,t
af,t−1
. (7)
The effective number of hours worked at the firm level is determined by the short side of
the market:
nf,t = min
{
nsf,t, n
d
f,t
}
. (8)
It follows that if the demand constraint is binding, i.e. ndf,t > nsf,t, the firm is not able to cover
all the opened vacancies it will produce qf,t < qˆf,t. On the contrary if the supply constraint
is binding, unemployment arises. In the centralized matching scenario, there is no frictional
unemployment, and disequilibria at the micro-level can emerge if and only if total labor demand
is higher or lower than total labor supply.
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Decentralized matching regime. The matching between firms and workers is local. Firms
post their vacancies and wage quotes. Workers decide to queue up or not for the job offered
by a firm with a probability increasing in the wage posted by the firm. Labour demand is
determined as in (7), but workers will search for open vacancies and will queue-up (Φh,t = 1)
or not (Φh,t = 0) for a job according to the following Bernoulli trial:
ΦLMh,t =

0 with probability pLMf,t
1 with probability 1− pLMf,t
(9)
A worker can queue up for one and only one job. In the case she queues up she supplies
inelastically one unit of labour. The probability of queuing (1 − pLMf,t ) is proportional to the
wage offered by the firm relative to the market average wage:
1− pLMf,t = 1−
1
ρLM
[
1−
(
Wf,t − W¯t
W¯t
)]
(10)
In the above equation. W¯t is the market average wage and ρLM ∈ (1,∞) is a parameter
determining the degree of search frictions (and imperfect information) in the market. The
higher the value of ρLM , the higher the probability that workers will queue up for any given
difference between the firm’s wage and the average one. It follows that higher values of ρLM also
imply higher intensity of competition in recruiting workers, as workers become more sensitive
to wage differences across firms.
Finally, as in the previous scenario, the effective hours at the firm level are determined by the
short side of the market, according to (8). However, notice that, differently from the centralized
scenario, decentralized matching implies that frictional unemployment (or labor rationing) may
arise even when the notional aggregate labor demand and aggregate labor supply are equal.
2.3.2 The goods market
The determination of supply is common in both scenarios: right after the labour market closes
and the workers have been allocated to the firms, the production of goods take place by means
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of the linear production process specified in Eq. (3).
Centralized matching scenario. Desired consumption (cfr, equation 5) is aggregated over
households. Then total consumption, Cˆt =
∑
h cˆh,t is allocated to each firm f on the basis of
the firm’s price relative to the average in the market. The (real) demand of the good for a
single firm f is computed as follows
qdf,t =
Cˆt
F
[
1−
(
Pf,t
P¯t
− 1
)]
. (11)
Notice that the above allocation is equivalent to the one that would emerge in equilibrium
in Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. Moreover, the quantity of the consumption good
effectively sold by a firm depends on the shortest side of the market:
qf,t = min
{
qdf,t, q
s
f,t
}
. (12)
If demand is higher than supply, then consumers are rationed in a symmetric fashion. In
contrast, if supply is higher than demand, the firm will have unsold output that perishes (as
the good is not storable) and might incur into losses.
Decentralized matching scenario. Contrary to the previous scenario, there is no centralized
device attributing consumption shares to firms, and demand allocation is an emergent property
of a costly search and matching process. In addition, similarly to the decentralized labour
market scenario, we assume that consumers decide whether to queue-up (ΦGMh,t = 1) or not
(ΦGMh,t = 0) for the goods sold by firms with a Bernoulli trial, which is formulated as follows
ΦGMh,t =

0 with probability 1− pGMf,t
1 with probability pGMf,t
(13)
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where the probability of a success pGMf,t reads
pGMf,t =
1
ρGM
[
1−
(
Pf,t − P¯t
P¯t
)]
(14)
A household queues up in only one firm, demanding cˆh,t units of the good. Notice that
the probability of queuing up falls with the price Pf,t. Accordingly, more price-competitive
firms will also get longer queues and higher demand for their good. Moreover, the parameter
ρGM ∈ (1,∞) in 14 is inversely related to the quality of the matching in the good market.
The higher is the value of the parameter, the lower the reaction of firms to differences between
firm’s price and the average price in the market. Accordingly, higher values of ρGM imply higher
matching frictions and less competitive markets for goods.
Once all the households have queued up, the effective amount of sold product by a firm, qf,t,
is determined by the short side of the market as in Equation (12). Again if demand overcomes
supply consumers are symmetrically rationed. If the opposite happens, the firm will have some
unsold non-storable output that perishes.
2.4 Financial conditions, exit and entry
After the matching process in the goods market is concluded, households determine their ef-
fective real consumption ch,t ≤ cˆh,t and their consumption expenditure ∑Ff=1 Pf,tchf,t. They
also compute savings, as the difference between income and effective nominal consumption.
Households’ income is represented by the wage they receive for the work they supply, Wh,t, and
the fraction of firms profits paid as dividends, Dh,t. Accordingly, savings, Sh,t, are determined
as:
Sh,t = Wh,t +Dh,t −
F∑
f=1
Pf,tchf,t (15)
Furthermore, we assume that the only assets available in the economy is money, which pays a
zero interest rate. Household’s wealth at the beginning of the next period Ah,t+1 is accordingly
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determined as:
Ah,t+1 = Ah,t + Sh,t. (16)
A household is declared bankrupt whenever her wealth becomes negative. In such a situation,
household’s wealth is reconstituted via a fund created by the non-bankrupt households and is
set equal to the average of the non-bankrupt households.
Firms’ profits Πf,t are equal to total sales revenues net of labor costs:
Πf,t = qf,tPf,t − nf,tWf,t. (17)
If Πf,t > 0, firms distribute dividends to households. More precisely, if profits are positive, a
firm f pay the fraction 1 − ϑ as dividends. If profits are negative, firm’s net worth is reduced
accordingly. The law of motion of Af,t+1 is than equal to:
Af,t+1 =

Af,t + ϑΠ+f,t
Af,t + Π−f,t
(18)
where 0 6 ϑ 6 1 is a parameter governing the fraction of retained profits and Π+f,t,Π−f,t are
respectively positive or negative profits of the firm f in the period t. As firm ownerships is
symmetric, each households receives a fraction 1/H of the dividends paid by each firm. It
follows that the dividends received by household h in period t are equal to
Dh,t =
(1− ϑ)
H
F∑
f=1
Π+f,t (19)
A firm is declared bankrupt when her net-worth is negative. In such a situation, the firm
exits the market and it is replaced by a new entrant, which is constituted by the households,
consistently with the fact that they are the owners. The initial amount of net-worth provided to
the newly established firm is equal to the average net-worth of all the alive firms. Prices, wages
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and desired production of the new firm are also computed as the average of the incumbents.
3 Simulation results
As anticipated in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to investigate the conditions that
allows an economy populated by heterogeneous, interacting agents to converge to the full em-
ployment equilibrium. In particular, we want to study how the matching protocols in labor
and good markets affect the convergence process.
The model presented in the previous section contains a deterministic skeleton that can be
hit by exogenous stochastic shocks affecting structural variables (e.g. productivity). Such a
structure is akin to DSGE models (e.g. Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2011) and it allows a
direct comparison of the impulse-response functions (IRFs) generated by both types of models.
However, in our model all decisions are based on heuristic rules and, in contrast with the
typical DSGE model, agents’ behavior is adaptive and not grounded on hyper rational, forward
looking behavior (see Fagiolo and Roventini, 2012, 2016, for a direct comparison of DSGE and
agent-based models).
Moreover, our model is characterized by the presence of a full employment symmetric equi-
librium. More precisely, we define the full employment symmetric equilibrium as a situation
characterized by

∆xt = 0, ∀x ∈ Ω
u˜t = 0, y˜t = 0, p˜it = 0
(20)
where Ω is an array containing all the model (micro and macro) variables (x), y˜t is the out-
put gap, and u˜t and p˜it are respectively the deviation of unemployment and inflation from
their steady state values. This means that, consistently with the DSGE framework, in our
agent-based skeleton we have a possible emerging limit case in which not only the system is
characterized by a situation of full-employment equilibrium, but also by agents’ homogeneity.
Such a result further improves the assessment of the results generated by our model vis-à-vis
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those of DSGE ones.
Let us now consider several simulation exercises3 in order to study the stability of the full
employment equilibrium under different productivity shocks for alternative matching scenarios
in the labor and goods markets (cfr. Section 3.1). We will then assess the robustness of our
results in Section 3.2. Table 1 contains the values of the parameters of our baseline simulation
environment.
Model Parameters
Symbol Value Meaning
MC 100 Monte Carlo realizations
T 1500 time simulations
H 200 number of households
F 20 number of firms
α 0.4 sensitivity to main economic effects
β 0.4 sensitivity to social effects
γ 0.4 sensitivity of wage/price indexations
ϑ 0.5 percentage of retained profits
ρLM 2 easiness of matching in the labour market
ρGM 2 difficulty of matching in the goods market
µη -0.01 supply shock average
ση 0.002 supply shock variance
ρη 0.98 supply shock persistence
Table 1: Baseline parametrization of the model.
3.1 The effects of productivity shocks
We begin by initializing the variables of the model (consumption, wages, prices, production,
firms’ net worth, households’ wealth, etc.) at values compatible with the full-employment,
symmetric equilibrium of the economy (cfr. conditions (20) above). We then let a negative
technology shock hit the economy at the firm level and we study the stability of the ensuing
equilibrium and the convergence properties of the model. More precisely, we consider a negative,
3Simulations are performed with Matlab-R2014a on a Linux OS.
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idiosyncratic change in the value of firm productivity. The dynamics of the shock writes as:
af,t = a˜(1− ηf,t) where :

if t < t∗ ηf,t = 0
if t = t∗ ηf,t ∼ N (µη, ση)
if t > t∗ ηf,t = ρηηf,t−1
(21)
where µη, ση, and ρη represent, respectively, the mean, the standard deviation and the autore-
gressive persistence of the shock. Finally the parameter t∗, represents the time-period at which
the shock takes place for the first time.4
In what follows, the effect of supply shocks will be studied in both the fully centralized
scenario, wherein matching is centralized in both the labor and goods market, as well as in the
fully decentralized regime, wherein the search and matching processes are local in both markets.
The non-linearities in agents’ decision rules and their interaction patterns imply that the
model does not allow for analytical, closed-form solutions. This is a general feature of agent-
based models5 and it forces us to perform extensive Monte-Carlo analyses to wash away across-
simulation variability in order to study the dynamics of micro- and macro- variables. Conse-
quently, all results below refer to across-run averages over 100 replications and their standard-
error bands.
In all simulations we set the number of householdsH = 200 and the number of firms F = 20,
and we run the economy for T = 1500. We tune the shock by setting µη = −0.01, ση = 0.002,
ρη = 0.98 and t∗ = 50. All the simulations parameters are reported in Table 1.
3.1.1 Productivity shocks in the fully centralized scenario
In presence of a negative productivity shock, firm production falls immediately causing a period
of excess demand in the goods market (cfr. Eq. 1). As a consequence, households are rationed
4The above formulation of the productivity shock is also in line with Cooper and Schott (2013), who introduce
firm heterogeneity in a simple RBC by means of idiosyncratic technology shocks. In what follows, the shock
will hit all the firms, but the results are robust also with respect to shocks that hit only sub-samples of firms.
5Methodological issues concerning the exploration of the properties of agent-based models are discussed in
Fagiolo et al. (2007) and Fagiolo and Roventini (2012, 2016).
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Figure 1: Emergent macroeconomic dynamics under supply shocks. Fully centralized scenario.
and are forced to increase saving. Such a situation causes the firms to increase the demand
for labour. In the next period, as the system is still in full employment, the increase in labor
demand leads to a wage increase. In addition, prices will also rise as they are indexed to wages
and there is excess demand in the market for goods. However, as prices move before wages, the
real wage will fall.
The centralized allocation mechanism at work in the labor market avoids any rise in frictional
unemployment. This fact, together with the higher savings from demand rationing, contributes
to keep aggregate demand high,6 and the excess demand in the two markets to persist as
long as production is constrained by low productivity. However, as time goes by, productivity
6In particular, real savings from demand rationing rise more than the fall in real income due to lower real
wages.
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will monotonically return to its equilibrium level. Accordingly, production will be back to the
equilibrium level, causing excess demand to vanish. The system settles down in the original
equilibrium. In this scenario, out-of-equilibrium dynamics are only temporary and, as it is
revealed by Figure 1, the system is able to effectively reabsorb the shock.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the variance of the distributions of some key micro variables
of the model. The figure provides insights about the agents’ heterogeneity that underlies
the aggregate dynamics exposed above. As the plots reveal, the micro-level heterogeneity
introduced by the productivity shock is only temporary, in general very mild, and limited to
few variables of the system. In particular, constant hours worked together with full employment
lead to homogeneity in wages. Finally, the effects of agents’ heterogeneity do not persistently
affect macroeconomic dynamics and eventually dies off when the shock effects become nil.
The foregoing results show that an economy with fully centralized matching protocols is
able to restore the full-employment equilibrium without creating persistent distortions in the
system, and the emergence of coordination failures. This result is perfectly in line with DSGE
macroeconomics. In particular, the simulation dynamics in this scenario replicates the be-
haviour of standard impulse response functions (IRFs) produced by Real Business Cycles and
New Keynesian DSGE models (e.g. Clarida et al., 1999), as well the standard results in the
empirical macro literature that in presence of supply shock, prices and output react by moving
in opposite directions (see Blanchard, 1989).
3.1.2 Productivity shocks in the fully decentralized scenario
As search and matching processes are fully decentralized in both the labor and goods markets,
the productivity shock creates both frictional unemployment in the labor market, and micro
mismatches between demand and supply in the goods market. As a result, significant hetero-
geneity (see Figure 4) now emerges both at the firm level (in terms of prices, wage offers, output
and labor demand) as well as at household level (in terms of hours worked and incomes).
What is more, micro heterogeneity has now consequences at the aggregate level, amplifying
the effects of the initial shock. More precisely, the initial frictional unemployment stemming
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Figure 2: Micro-level variances under supply shocks. Fully centralized scenario.
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nario.
from decentralized matching in the labor market feeds back into lower consumption in the goods
market, thereby contributing to lower firm output, and therefore labor demand, and real wages.
Indeed, the fall in real wages is much stronger now than in the centralized scenario (compare
the second panel in Figures 3 and 1).
The emerging result is a disequilibrium wherein aggregate demand is lower than in the
full-employment case and fluctuates around the supply level, causing also involuntary unem-
ployment to emerge (cfr. Figure 3; see Dosi et al., 2013, 2015, 2010, 2016, for agent-based
models where involuntary unemployment emerges because of low aggregate demand).
Furthermore, differently from the fully centralized regime, coordination failures emerge and
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the economy is not able to reabsorb the shock. At the aggregate level, the output-gap and
unemployment keeps fluctuating around values that are, respectively, significantly lower and
higher that the full-employment equilibrium (cfr. Figure 3). The same occurs for the levels of
aggregate demand and supply, which keep on fluctuating at values significantly below the full
employment ones. Finally, and again in contrast with the fully centralized scenario, micro-level
variance does not fade away in the long-run (see Figure 4).
The only exceptions to the above general dynamics are represented by price inflation and
real wage. Indeed, the fluctuations of such variable are in the long-run much milder than for
the other variables (basically zero for inflation) and around steady-state values.
As both the mean and the variance of all the variables in the model exhibit fluctuations
around stable values in the long-run, we say that in this scenario the economy converges to
a statistical equilibrium, defined as a state where some relevant statistics of the system are
stationary (Grazzini and Richiardi, 2015; Guerini and Moneta, 2016).
The persistent heterogeneity at the micro-level arises because frictions in the search and
matching processes get now amplified by aggregate demand feedbacks in the market of goods
and by involuntary unemployment. As a consequence, micro-level heterogeneity now matters
for the aggregate, and it is in particular responsible for the persistent deviation of aggregate
variables from their full employment levels. In addition, and well in line with the original
Keynes’ analysis (see Clower and Leijonhufvud, 1975), price rigidity is not the source of un-
deremployment and coordination failures. Indeed, persistent unemployment and low aggregate
demand emerge notwithstanding the fact that the real wage falls and then eventually converges
to close-to-steady-state values.
3.1.3 Taking stock of productivity shocks in different search and matching scenarios
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained so far by presenting the long-run values of the main
aggregate variables following the negative supply shock under different matching scenarios. The
values presented in the table are averages across 100 Monte-Carlo iterations.
As the table shows quite neatly, the economy is always able to return to the full-employment
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output-gap unemployment inflation real-wage
Supply Shock FC -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Supply Shock FD -0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2: Long-run values of the main aggregate variables for different matching scenarios.
Values are averages over MC=100 Monte-Carlo iterations. Monte-Carlo standard errors in
parentheses. FC: fully centralized scenario. FD: fully decentralized scenario.
equilibrium in the fully centralized scenario. In contrast, the presence of a statistical equilibrium
different from the full employment one emerges as a robust property7 across simulation runs in
the fully decentralized scenario. Such a statistical equilibrium is always characterized by values
of output and unemployment that are respectively lower and higher than the full employment
equilibrium. Moreover the real wage is lower than in full employment (see the last column
of Table 2). However, differently from DSGE models, a fall in the real wage is not able to
eliminate employment from the labor market.
Our simulation results show the importance of heterogeneity and interactions for explaining
persistent fluctuations in decentralized markets. Indeed, depending on the type of search and
matching process, an ecology of heterogeneous agents following adaptive rules might or might
not generate a situation of peristent underemployment. Such a difference in dynamics cannot
typically be observed in New Keynesian DSGE models as they are nested in a representative
agent equilibrium framework.
3.2 Robustness checks
In the previous section we documented how an economy endowed with a decentralized search
and matching structure is not able to reabsorb the effects of an adverse supply shock and to go
back to the full employment equilibrium. In this section we turn to investigate the robustness
of the foregoing result to changes in some of the key parameters of the model.
7We also tested the robustness of the statistical equilibrium by performing Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of
equality in distributions of the Monte-Carlo time series generated by the model for the different macroeconomic
variables. Results of the tests showed that - for most variables - the distributions were the same in all Monte-
Carlo iterations. This indicates that most variables converge to the same statistical equilibrium in the different
Monte-Carlo iterations.
22
−0.10
−0.08
−0.06
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 − ϑ
lo
ng
−r
u
n
 s
ta
t. 
eq
.
variable
c.i.
mean
Output−gap
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 − ϑ
lo
ng
−r
u
n
 s
ta
t. 
eq
.
variable
c.i.
mean
Unemployment
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 − ϑ
lo
ng
−r
u
n
 s
ta
t. 
eq
.
variable
c.i.
mean
Inflation
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 − ϑ
lo
ng
−r
u
n
 s
ta
t. 
eq
.
variable
c.i.
mean
Real Wage
Figure 5: Effects of a variation on the percentage of retained profits parameters ϑ. The green
line represents the mean of the last Tss = 200 periods of the simulation, for any parameter
value. The black lines represent instead the maximum and the minimum attained in the same
time interval.
We first investigate the robustness of the model with respect to the seed in the random
number generator governing the impact of the shock in Equation (21). We find that all results
of the model are robust to different sequences of random numbers.
We then study how the results of the model are affected by the persistence of productivity
shocks (cfr. Equation 21). As expected, increasing the persistence of the shock has only effects
in the fully centralized scenario, lowering the speed of convergence of the economy to the full
employment.8
The parameter regulating the percentage of profits firms distribute as dividends (1 − ϑ) is
particularly relevant to study as it provides a neat assessment of the role that aggregate demand
dynamics play in the model. Indeed, higher amount of dividends could possibly compensate
the fall in real wages experienced by workers after a negative productivity shock. The impact
of this parameter on the main variables of the model is documented in Figure 5. As 1 − ϑ
8The results related to these first two robustness exercises are available from the authors upon request.
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increases, a larger amount of profits gets distributed to the households/workers (see Equation
(19). This should counter-balance the negative effects of falling real wages on consumption
demand, thus increasing the resilience of the economy. However, as Figure 5 shows, this is
not the case. The output-gap and unemployment are basically invariant with respect to an
increase in the share of dividends paid to households. Only the inflation rate and the real wage
are (mildly) affected for extreme high values of the parameters. A scenario where almost all
profits are paid out as dividends spur excess demand for goods for many firms as dividends
finance consumption via savings. As a consequence, firms increase prices, thus leading to the
surge of average inflation observed for extremely high values of 1 − ϑ. Finally, high inflation
rate together with the depressing effect of unemployment of nominal wages explains the fall
observed in the real wage.
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Figure 6: Effects of a simultaneous variation in the quality of matching in the labor and goods
markets. The values on the x-axis represent the probability of queuing up in each market.
Our final robustness analysis exercise concerns the parameters ρLM and ρGM , which measure
the quality of the matching in the labor and product market. Higher values of ρLM increase the
probability that workers queue up at any given firm, thus increasing the quality of matching in
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the labor market. Moreover, decreasing ρGM raises the probability that households queue up
at any given firm in the goods market, thereby boosting the matching quality in that market.
In our sensitivity exercise we change at the same time both parameters, so that the quality
of matching increases by the same amount in both markets. The results of this exercise are
reported in Figure 6. We find that simultaneously increasing the easiness of the matching in
both labor and goods markets improves the overall resilience of the system. Indeed, the average
output gap increases and gets closer to the full employment value, unemployment and inflation
falls. Finally, the average real wage is on average smaller. Simulation exercises show that,
when the quality of the matching increases, the economy shows an improved ability to return
to full employment equilibrium after a productivity shock, getting closer to the results of the
fully centralized scenario. This is not surprising because, first, increasing the quality of the
matching makes interactions in the labor and in the goods markets less local. With higher
ρLM and lower ρGM workers and consumers queue up at a larger fraction of firms for any given
price and wage differences. Second, a better matching also implies higher sensitivity of labor
and consumption demand to cross-firms price differentials in both markets. Accordingly, price
variations can quickly mop up micro-disequilibria in both markets and, as a result, adjustment
mechanisms mimic the ones at work in representative agent DSGE models (e.g. unemployment
is reduced via a fall in real wages).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we develop an agent-based model (ABM) where an ecology of heterogeneous firms
and households interact in labor and good markets according to centralized or local search and
matching processes. The model is characterized by a full employment symmetric equilibrium
and by a deterministic backbone that can be hit by exogenous, stochastic shocks. The structure
of our ABM is akin to the one of DSGE models and it allows a direct comparison of the impulse-
response functions observed in those frameworks. However, in DSGE models, a fully-rational
representative agent take optimal decisions, whereas in our ABM, heterogeneous agents behave
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according to adaptive rules and explicitly interact in markets. In that, our model takes into
account the insights stemming from behavioral economics (e.g. Camerer et al., 2011; Gigerenzer
and Goldstein, 2011) and search theory (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
We study the response of the economy to a negative productivity shock under two different
institutional arrangements governing interactions in labor and goods markets. In the fully cen-
tralized scenario, a fictitious auctioneer distributes the labour force and consumption demand
across firms following allocation rules similar to those emerging in the equilibrium of monopo-
listically competitive markets. In the fully decentralized scenario, search and matching is local.
Accordingly, frictions and firms and households heterogeneity can arise due to the imperfect
allocation of labor and demand across firms.
We find that in the fully centralized scenario, the economy is always able to return to
the full employment equilibrium after a shock and it displays a dynamics very similar to the
one generated by standard DSGE models. In contrast, when search is local the economy
persistently deviates from full employment, and converges to a statistical equilibrium where
output and unemployment are lower than the full employment values and where firms and
households display persistent heterogeneity. The interplay between matching frictions in the
labour markets and positive demand feedbacks is at the core of the above result. In the fully
decentralized scenario the supply shock generates heterogeneity across firms and some frictional
unemployment. The latter has however a negative impact on household consumption and
therefore on aggregate demand in the goods market, thus triggering involuntary unemployment
of a Keynesian type. In such a situation, the fall in the real wage contributes to foster deviations
of the economy from the full employment rather than contributing to restoring it.
We also investigated the robustness of the above result to different degree of efficiencies
of matching in labor and goods markets. We show that higher matching efficiency has a
beneficial effect on the ability of the economy to return to full employment. Indeed, a better
matching greases the wheel of the market allocation mechanisms, and the decentralized economy
becomes more similar to the fully centralized one, where prices are able to put markets back
to equilibrium (as in DSGE models).
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Our results have at least two implications for the current macroeconomic theory. First
they show that, under some conditions, an agent-based model embedding boundedly rational
decison rules is able to generate dynamics resembling those produced by DSGE models, and in
particular to display convergence to full employment equilibrium. At the same, our results also
show that such an outcome depends on the restrictive assumptions concerning the interaction
structure in labor and goods markets. When information is dispersed in the economy (as it
is typically the case in reality), and interactions are local, market mechanisms can generate
significant heterogeneity across economic actors and trigger positive economic feedbacks that
pull the economy away from full employment.
Our model can be extended in many directions. First, we have not considered the possible
stabilizing role of the interest rate. One could therefore modify the consumption rule introduc-
ing intertemporal substitution effects and then study the ability of monetary policy to put back
the economy to the full employment steady state. Second, we have not considered the possible
effects of demand shocks in the model and the possible differences in dynamics with respect
to the ones presented here. Third, we could further explore the impact of different speed of
adjustment in the goods and labor markets along the lines of Solow and Stiglitz (1968). Finally,
one could better study the role of social interaction effects in both markets, by changing the
underlying structure of network interactions.
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